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This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in 
the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior 
with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending 
infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of 
amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects 
of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the 
interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also 
consider various extensions such as intertemporal transfers of policing funds, risk-
aversion, and “fuzziness” in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at 
apprehending and deporting undesirables. 
JEL Classification Codes: J61, J68, H59 
Keywords: Amnesty, Immigration, Illegal Immigration, Border Controls, Internal 
Controls. 
a Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel. 
b IZA, Bonn. 
c CEPR, London. 




Among the most hotly debated issues in economic and political circles worldwide 
are those regarding the effects immigrants have on host countries. There has been a 
myriad of economic articles written on the subject (see, for example, Borjas, 1994 and 
1995, and Zimmermann, 1995 for excellent surveys), and it has been a central issue in 
numerous elections throughout the Western hemisphere. One thing is clear – except in 
unusual circumstances,
1 Western countries tend to spend significant resources towards 
limiting the number and/or types of immigrants they allow into their countries. These 
limits are upheld via both border controls, through which undesired people are blocked 
from entering, and via internal enforcement, whereby undesired people are apprehended 
and expelled from the country (see, e.g., Ethier, 1986).  
Despite these efforts, however, many illegal immigrants tend to find a way to slip 
through cracks in the system, if the benefit from doing so is sufficiently large. As a 
result, the more prosperous countries tend to find themselves in a position whereby, 
despite their best efforts, a stock of illegal immigrants accumulates and grows in their 
countries, and the government is incapable of apprehending and deporting these illegals. 
While there have been extensive debates about the effects legal immigrants have on an 
economy, there is little doubt that these illegal immigrants inflict a far greater burden on 
the host economy. This is because, aside from the burden legal migrants impose on a 
country, illegal migrants impose additional costs by the essence of their illegality, in 
that they tend not to pay taxes, and they are often involved in clandestine activities. This 
latter occurs due to their reluctance to enter the mainstream of the economy, and their 
inability to attain jobs in which they may be noticed.  
One way countries have increasingly dealt with such problems is to periodically 
grant an amnesty to any worker who can demonstrate that he/she fulfills certain 
requirements (such as length of stay in the country, no criminal record, etc.). In these 
amnesties, workers who come forward are put through a procedure, at the end of which 
                                                 
1 There were instances in which immigration was not only not discouraged, but was actively sought. For 
example, in the middle of this century Germany was in dire need of workers, and actively sought 
temporary workers from neighboring countries. Many of these "temporary" workers remained in the 
country after contracts expired, and became a part of the large illegal immigrant population of Germany. 
There are signs that this policy of actively seeking temporary workers is making a comeback due to the 
low birth rate and the subsequent aging of the population.    
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they are either “regularized” by being given some type of permit to remain (ranging 
from a one-year permit to citizenship) or expelled. Table 1 presents select information 
about amnesties over the past twenty years. As seen in this table, the number of illegal 
workers regularized has been quite significant, and there have been a number of 
countries that have had recurring amnesties over a fairly short period of time. Currently, 
in fact, there are ongoing discussions in the U.S., Italy, Greece, Israel and other Western 
countries about granting additional amnesties. In many instances, when countries grant 
these amnesties, they concurrently announce plans to clamp down on border controls. 
  This paper is the first attempt to our knowledge to develop a theory to explain 
amnesties. The focus will be on the host country, with the behavior of existing 
immigrants, potential future immigrants, and the government taken explicitly into 
account.  
While there have been numerous studies of tax amnesties (see, for example, Malik 
and Schwab, 1991, and Andreoni, 1991) there are a few basic reasons why we cannot 
implement these results and models into the migration literature. First, a tax amnesty 
helps the authorities receive information about the illegal activities of different 
individuals and institutes.  As a result of the amnesty the authorities can gain knowledge 
on methods used to evade taxes, and will be better placed to detect future illegal 
activities. This is not the case in migration amnesties, where there is little knowledge to 
be gained by authorities. While it may be argued that the authorities learn the origins of 
the illegal migrants, a fact that may help them allocate their border control budgets more 
efficiently, this information is in general already known to the authorities and is not the 
main objective. Second, one benefit from a tax amnesty is that the identity of the 
transgressor becomes known, which will tend to discourage him from future illegal 
activities of this sort, since the authorities are "wise to him." A legalized immigrant, 
however, will no longer have any incentive to become an illegal immigrant again. Third, 
a tax amnesty is backward looking in that with it authorities attempt to collect taxes 
owed from previous years, that might otherwise be lost. This element is not present in 
immigration amnesties, and it is only the future that is under consideration. Finally, 
immigration amnesties deal with people, and as such the amnesty has widespread 
implications such as externalities on other residents. This, of course, is what 
differentiates between labor economics and other branches of microeconomics. These 
important differences make tax and immigrant amnesties incompatible, although there 
are similarities in other aspects.   
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The reasons a country might not desire immigration, particularly of low-skilled 
workers, have been widely discussed (see, e.g., Borjas, 1994). As mentioned above, 
much of the supplementary objection to illegal immigration stems from the fact that 
illegal immigrants tend to be free riders – not paying their share of the tax burden while 
consuming public resources – and that because of their illegality they tend to be more 
involved in illicit activities, both by choice and when it is forced on them.
2 Additional 
issues may include high social costs (schooling, health care, etc.) decreases in the wages 
of native workers, and effects on unemployment among natives, although these issues 
are pertinent for legal migrants also. Whether these costs exist and the magnitude of 
these costs are moot, yet the empirical observation that almost all countries limit 
immigration and try to keep illegals out, means, at the very least, that government 
officials believe there is some potential harm from allowing free migration. As a result, 
countries allocate considerable resources to agencies with the sole purpose of 
controlling immigration (e.g., the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the 
U.S.). 
The next question then is, if illegal workers are indeed more of a burden to a 
country than legal immigrants, why not immediately legalize all those who manage to 
cross the border? The immediate answer to this question is that such a policy will affect 
the incentives of other foreigners to attempt to enter the country – an act that will surely 
increase illegal immigration. In addition, legalized workers cannot be thrown out, while 
apprehended illegal workers can be. Thus, the illegal status may be preferred in order to 
allow for apprehension and deportation. Finally, political-economy reasons for keeping 
the workers illegal may exist, such as the benefit from having workers confined to 
certain sectors, which can be guaranteed in a democratic society only if they are illegal 
(Hillman and Weiss, 1999), or the benefit from having them largely unemployed for 
efficiency wage purposes (Epstein and Hillman, 2000). 
The question then becomes, why have an amnesty at all? One justification could 
be to offset the negative effects increasing border and internal control expenditures can 
have on a country.  There exists a literature on the effects of these expenditures on the 
economy of the host country. Djajic (1999) examines the dynamic implications of 
border control policies and internal enforcement on illegal immigration, and the sectoral 
                                                 
2 There are numerous instances of illegal workers being taken advantage of and being the victims of 
crimes.  
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allocation of clandestine foreign workers.  Myers and Papageorgiou (2000) present a 
model of a rich country with a redistributive public sector facing costly immigration 
control. They show that as border control becomes more expensive, inequality in the 
rich country increases. 
Other reasons abound. First, the social costs from migrants may increase at a 
faster rate if the migrants are illegal than if they are legal. These social costs include 
illegals, as mentioned above, being involved in more crimes, both as felons and as 
victims. If this is so, there may be a critical mass at which point it becomes cheaper to 
legalize them than to continue bearing this additional cost. Second, the existence of a 
very large illegal base may signal the natives that illegality is acceptable and cause them 
to not pay taxes, for instance (since their illegal neighbors don't). Third, a large illegal 
immigrant presence may be a sign of impotence on the part of a government – which 
may be harmful both domestically and internationally. Fourth, it may be considered 
inhumane to have such a large illegal population, many of whom live in poverty. 
Finally, an amnesty will increase the tax base. 
For all these reasons, and many others, the system is as it is. The illegal 
immigration is unwanted, money is spent to keep them out, and, if they infiltrate, to find 
them and deport them. However, if these steps are not sufficiently successful, and the 
population of illegals grows too big, the country may be better off legalizing them. At 
that point an amnesty is offered, much of the illegal population becomes legalized, and 
the country shifts expenditures from internal controls (which becomes less necessary 
after the amnesty is granted) to more border controls. It is therefore not surprising that 
announcements of amnesties are often coupled with announcements about new 
measures taken to stop infiltration at the border. 
The model will be presented as follows. In section II we first consider a country 
without an amnesty, and then show the effects of an amnesty. To this end, Section IIA 
begins with a country to which an exogenous number of people would like to 
immigrate, and considers the optimal manner in which the country should allocate its 
resources to controlling illegal immigration, when its options are spending funds on 
border control or on internal control. The former is earmarked towards stopping 
infiltration by illegals, and the latter towards apprehending individuals who managed to 
infiltrate. We show how the stock of illegal immigrants grows over time, and find the 
steady-state number of illegal immigrants.  
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Section IIB takes a more careful look at the migrants and their incentives. A 
model is presented in which the decision to migrate depends upon relative wages and 
the probability of being caught and deported. We show how the different parameters, 
including allocations to border and internal control, affect the size of the flow of 
migrants. This behavior by potential migrants feeds back into governmental allocation 
decisions, and a revised steady-state level of illegal migrants is derived.  
We then turn in Section IIC to amnesties. We show how an amnesty affects the 
stock and flow of illegal immigrants, and, in turn, the cost to the country of these 
migrants. The cost is divided into two parts – the cost of the migrants who have been 
legalized, and the cost of the migrants who will arrive after the amnesty. One of the 
central issues is the effect an amnesty will have on migrant expectations. In particular, if 
potential migrants believe that amnesties will recur, the flow of migrants into the 
country will increase, implying a larger cost to the country. We demonstrate how the 
optimal time of an amnesty is determined, and show the conditions necessary for this to 
be an equilibrium. 
Section IID considers the possibility of a delayed amnesty, under which only 
those in the country for a certain minimum number of years or more are eligible for the 
amnesty, is considered. We show how this feeds back into potential migrant decisions, 
and, consequently, into costs, and demonstrate the tradeoff from such a plan. 
Section IIE looks at a limited amnesty, in which illegal workers who come 
forward are granted a work permit for a fixed period, after which they are forced to 
return to their home country. Enforcement of the time period can be guaranteed by use 
of a bond deposited by the migrant or by someone willing to vouch for him. One of the 
effects of this plan is that some of the illegal immigrants do not make use of the 
amnesty, as it is preferable for them to remain in the country illegally, and take their 
chances that they will not be caught quickly. 
Section III considers some extensions to the model, including intertemporal 
transfers of control budgets, risk aversion and uncertainty. Our discussion on 
uncertainty stems from an empirical peculiarity. One of the results of many amnesties is 
that some applicants are refused amnesty, and are then deported. If the criteria for 
receiving the amnesty are well known, we would not expect anyone to be expelled as a 
result of the amnesty, since all those who would be expelled would not step forward. 
For expulsions to exist the criteria must be unclear, and the reason immigrants come  
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forward nonetheless is that their expected gain exceeds their expected loss. Thus, 
amnesty programs can also be a mechanism for ridding the country of some 
undesirables.  
In Section IV we summarize. 
 
II. The Model 
A. Border vs. Internal controls 
Consider a country into which  i m  individuals want to migrate in year i. For the 
present  mi is treated as exogenous, but this treatment is changed below where its 
determinants are discussed. Denote by  i M  the stock of migrants in the country at the 
end of year i, and assume, for simplicity, that initially, in period 0, there are no 
migrants, so that  0 0 = M . In the absence of efforts to hinder such immigrants from 
entering and residing in the country, the stock of illegal immigrants in the country at the 








i t m M .  
The government has at its disposal in year i a budget  i E  earmarked for 
immigration control. Following Ethier (1986) expenditures can be bifurcated into 
expenditures for border controls and those for internal controls, where the former refers 
to expenditures aimed at keeping illegal immigrants from entering the country, and the 
latter refers to expenditures aimed at apprehending illegals who managed to enter the 




i E E E = + , where 
B
i E  are 
expenditures in period i on border controls and 
I
i E  are expenditures on internal 
controls. We further assume, for simplicity only, that the time sequence is such that 
expenditures on internal controls are effective only in apprehending illegals who are 
already in the country at the start of the period, and not for entrants during that period. 
Note that under these conditions all expenditures on immigration control in period 1 
will be on border controls alone, since there is no stock of immigrants to attempt to 
apprehend and extradite. Thus,  1 1 E E
B = . 
These expenditures are productive in preventing infiltration and in apprehending 








i E P  denote the percentage of illegals apprehended at  
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the border and internally in year i, respectively, with () 0 >
′ j
i P ,  () 0 <
″ j
i P ,  () 0 0 =
j
i P , 
and  () 1 = ∞
j
i P ,  I B j , = .
3 Given this, the stock of illegals in the country in any given 
year is given by 
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Solving this recursively: 
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1 1
1 1.  
The government's objective function (assuming no discounting for simplicity) is 
assumed (for now) to be to minimize a weighted average of the stock of migrants over a 
certain (possibly infinite) period, i.e., to 
(3) 
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To understand this equation, note that the stock of illegals in the country in period k 
depends on the flow in period i multiplied by the percentage of immigrants that 




i E P − 1 , and by the probability that 









1 . From this we can 
derive the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. Allocations between internal and border controls are independent of time 
preferences.  
Proof.  What this lemma states is that the weights do not effect the allocation of 
resources. To see this, replace the third constraint into the objective function by 




i E E E − = . Consider the effect of transferring 
                                                 
3 Our assumption is that the percentage caught depends on expenditures and not the number of those 
caught. This assumption may be extreme, but it conveys the idea that the greater the stock, the easier it is 
to find illegals – “like shooting fish in a barrel.”   
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expenditures from internal control to border control in period i. Clearly, from the first 
statement in (3), this will not effect the stock of illegals prior to period i. Thus, the 
















































Hence, the first order condition for a maximum is (using 1): 





























j i k i M P m P P α . 
Note that the term in the square brackets is clearly positive, so the allocations will be 
made optimally so that the term in the rounded brackets will equal zero. Since the 
weights  i α  do not appear in the rounded brackets, the choice of allocation of funds in 
any year i is independent of these weights, as per Lemma 1.     Q.E.D. 
The logic behind this finding is that since the budget is fixed, and the stock 
existing at the end of one period is passed on to the subsequent period, allocating 
resources to minimize the stock in one period will automatically minimize the stock in 
future periods also, since a smaller stock is being passed on. The message from this 
Lemma is that the optimization problem as specified is sensible for deciding how to 
allocate resources between these two uses, since as long as a small stock is desired, the 
government will act as prescribed by (3) with respect to allocations between border and 
internal controls, independent of its actual objective function. 
From (3) we also get 
Lemma 2. The larger the stock relative to the flow, the more resources will be allocated 
to internal control. 















Since the left hand side of (7) is a decreasing function of 
B
i E , the result in the Lemma 
f o l l o w s .           Q.E.D. 
This result is intuitive, and has the following implications. Assume that the 
probability functions are such that the stock is initially (in period 1) growing. This 
amounts to assuming that 
(8)  ( ) 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 > − − = ∆ M P m P M
I B . 
The first term is the inflow of migrants, and the second term is those being deported 
from among the migrants who made it passed the border in period 1. If (8) holds, then 
the stock will continue to grow initially. Assuming a nonincreasing flow over time,  
Lemma 2 says that this will lead to less border control and more internal control in order 
to lower the stock. If the flow of migrants becomes constant a steady state will exist 
when 




i M P m P , 
at which point funds will no longer be shifted from border to internal controls. Clearly, 
however, the level of the stock in the steady state will depend on the level of the flow at 
that steady state. The determinants of this flow are the subject of the next sub-section. 
 
B. The Migrants 
We turn now to consider the migrants. The incentive for them to migrate is the 
wage differential between their home country and the host country. This differential 
must be great enough to outweigh the cost of being deported if caught.
4 In what follows 
we assume for simplicity that potential migrants are risk neutral. 
There are Q heterogeneous workers in the source country each year who are 
interested in migrating. Wages vary across workers, with the distribution of source 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, we do not include a migration cost (pecuniary or non-pecuniary, with an example of the 
latter being the emotional cost of leaving home and ones loved ones). Thus, the assumption is that an 
unsuccessful migrant can simply return home without any penalty. There might, however, be a cost for 
the successful migrant, who is placed in unfamiliar surroundings. This could be incorporated in the model 
by removing this cost from the first period wages if he gets passed the border controls. This would not 
effect the results.  
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country wages by potential migrants given by  ( )
I S
i W W , 0 ~ , where 
I W  is the wage 
received in the host country as an illegal immigrant.  ( )
S
i W g  is the pdf and  ( )
S
i W G  the 
cdf of the wage distribution. Anyone earning more than 
I W in the source is not a 
potential migrant. The cost of being deported is denoted by  D C . Workers will migrate if 
their expected income in the host country during their N years in the workforce is 
greater than the expected income in the source country over the same period.
5 For 
simplicity we assume no discounting. 




i NW V = . In the host 
country the expected wage depends on the probability of being caught and deported. For 
worker i in period e this is given by: 











































i P C W W P P NW e V . 
The first term equals the wage in the source country, so that the remainder is the wage 
premium from migration. This premium, ( )
S
i
I W W − , is achieved only if the worker 
manages to slip through the border controls which happens with probability ( )
B









1  represents the probability of still being in the country in year i, and 












k e P  is the sum of these probabilities over the N years. Note in particular 
the 1 in this equation stems from the fact that the migrant will receive the premium in 
the first period with certainty since internal controls are relevant only for those in the 
country the prior year (by definition). The final term is the expected cost of being 














1 1 being the probability of being deported at some time in 
the future.  




i V V >  will attempt to migrate. Thus, the flow of 
migrants in period 1 will be given by: 
                                                 
5 Note that the calculations in the previous Section implicitly assumed that workers are infinitely lived, 
while here we assume workers have a finite work-life. These can be reconciled if workers bear offspring, 
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Note that, quite naturally, an increase in internal control in future periods will lower the 
number of migrants attempting to enter the country. Thus, taking into consideration the 
behavior of the government as described in the previous section, we arrive at the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1. Beginning from an initial stock of migrants below the steady state level, 
the flow of migrants will decrease over time. 
Proof.    Recall from Lemma 2 that if the stock relative to the flow increases, more 
resources will be allocated to internal control. Assume a constant flow. If we begin with 
a stock below the steady-state for that size flow, (8) will hold, and the stock will grow. 
Then, from Lemma 2, future allocations to border control will decrease in favor of 
increased allocations to internal control. As a result, from (11), the flow will fall. 
            Q.E.D. 
With the flow falling but the stock rising, a steady-state will be approached, and it 
will be reached when (9) holds, at which point allocations and flows will remain 
constant.  This steady state is shown in the two panels of Figure 1. The top panel shows 
how allocations are changing over time, and the bottom panel shows the implications 
for the stock and flow of migrants over time. Both show the steady-state levels of the 
variables. 
 
C. An Amnesty  
To understand the effect of an amnesty, we first consider how the expectation of 
an amnesty will affect the flow of migrants, and then show the consequences of an 
amnesty for the host country. Given these consequences, we show how the optimal 
timing of an amnesty is determined. 
Assume, then, that a country decides to grant an amnesty once every A years.
6 For 
this to be an equilibrium, each party must be aware of the incentives and reactions of the 
                                                 
6 The length of time between amnesties will be constant in equilibrium because the problem always looks 
identical after each amnesty, as developed below.  
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other party, and must take these into account in choosing actions. Thus, in equilibrium, 
the timing of an amnesty (if any) is set by the government after taking into account the 
reaction of potential migrants to this timing, and migrants, in turn, know the 
governments objective function, and thus know when the amnesty will occur. After an 
amnesty workers become legal and can no longer be deported. The expected lifetime 
income of a person considering immigrating e periods before the amnesty will increase 
from (10) to:
 7 
(12)   
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This occurs for each cohort of potential immigrants from amnesty to amnesty, or, if the 
length between amnesties is greater than the work-life of the immigrant, for the last N 
years before an amnesty. 
Note that if expenditures on internal control are kept constant over time, the flow 
of migrants into the country is going to increase as the amnesty approaches (as e gets 
smaller). This is in direct contrast to Proposition 1. Even if, as per Lemma 2, 
expenditures on internal control rise over time, it is likely that the positive effect of the 
approaching amnesty, and the benefits to be realized if the migrant manages to escape 
detection until then, will outweigh the negative effect of increased internal control. 
Thus, Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 are most likely reversed if an amnesty is known to be 
forthcoming. The stock of migrants is demonstrated in Figure 2, in which the amnesty 
periods are marked. Note that the presence of an amnesty makes the shape of the curve 
between amnesties different from that presented in Figure 1. 
                                                 
7 Note we have assumed that the migrant's wage does not change after becoming legal. There is good 
reason to believe, however, that this wage would increase, as the employment options facing the legal 
migrant are far vaster than those facing an illegal immigrant. This increased wage would have the effect 
of further increasing the flow of immigrants as the amnesty date approaches.  
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Having shown the effect of an amnesty on potential migrants, we turn now to the 
government's decision to enact such an amnesty. In choosing whether and when to grant 
an amnesty, the government, for its part, must take into account not only the higher per 
period cost illegal immigrants inflict on the economy, but also the effect an amnesty 
will have on future immigration waves, as demonstrated above, and the fact that an 
illegal worker can be deported, while a legal worker cannot.  
We first posit the following: 
Proposition 2. The longer the length of time between amnesties, the larger will be the 
stock of illegal migrants prior to the amnesty. 
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Consider amnesties after A and A+1 periods, denoted the 
A-regime and the A+1-regime, respectively. In the period just before the amnesties, 
which we denote period T, the flow will be equal under the two regimes, since all Q 
workers will want to attempt entry into the country (since, if they get passed the border 
controls, they cannot be thrown out). If the stock of migrants under the two regimes is 
also equal, then by Lemma 2 allocations between internal and border controls will be 
identical. Returning to period T-1, the flows will again be equal because of the identical 
allocations in the last period. As a result, allocations will also be identical under the two 
regimes in period T-1. This can be continued until the period T-A. However, in period T-
A the stock under the A-regime is by definition 0 (since an amnesty was just declared) 
while that in the A+1-regime is positive because of the migration in the preceding 
period. Thus, the stocks cannot be equal in period T.   
Assume now that the stock in period T is larger under the A-regime than under the 
A+1-regime. In this case the flow in period T-1 will be smaller in the A-regime, so to get 
a larger stock in period T, an even larger stock must have remained form period T-1. 
Continuing, as in the previous paragraph, to period T-A, the stock in this period will 
have to be greater in the A-regime, which is impossible. Thus, the proposition holds.
            Q.E.D.  
This proposition is not obvious since the longer period before the amnesty will 
lead to smaller flows of migrants, and this effect had the potential to lead to a lower 
total illegal presence. From the proof it is clear why this does not occur. This 
proposition now allows us to consider all of the issues involved in choosing the optimal 
timing of an amnesty. The government’s quest is to allocate resources (on border and  
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internal controls) and to set policy (on the frequency of amnesties) in order to minimize 
the cost to the country from these immigrants. Allocations of resources are as derived 
above in Section IIA. An amnesty, however, entails a tradeoff. On the one hand, illegal 
immigrants are more costly to the country than if they were legalized, for the reasons 
discussed in the introduction. We denote the yearly cost of M illegal workers CI (M) and 
of M legal workers CL(M), with CI (M) > CL(M). Hence, the earlier the amnesty the less 
costs the country must bear from migrants already in the country. On the other hand, 
once a worker is legalized he can no longer be expelled, and the earlier the amnesty, the 
larger the flow of migrants (as developed above). Thus, for instance, if an amnesty is 
granted each year there is no cost from illegality (although there is a cost from the legal 
migrants), but all foreign workers with salaries below those paid locally will desire to 
migrate, and if they get passed the border controls they will forever remain.  
We now develop the conditions necessary for an amnesty once every A years to be 
optimal and an equilibrium. Assume the economy is at a point at which it must decide 
whether to grant an amnesty (A years after the last amnesty). Recall from the discussion 
above that the flow, and thus the stock, of illegal migrants depends on the allocation of 
expenditures on border and internal controls, and on the length of the amnesty period. 
The government takes this relationship into account in determining these parameters. 
We thus define the cost of illegal immigrants at period j given an amnesty period of A as 
CI(Mj(A)), and the cost of the same number of legal workers as CL(Mj(A)). At period A, 
when the government is considering granting an amnesty, the cost of the existing and all 
future illegal immigrants that will result from a policy of amnesties every A periods is 
given by: 

















where  δ  is the discount rate. The first term is the present value of the cost to the 
economy of those workers who have been legalized and will now remain in the country 
indefinitely. The second term is the cost of all those immigrants who arrive between this 
amnesty and the next amnesty. The final term reflects the fact that the problem the 
government faces before this amnesty is identical to the one it will face before the next 
amnesty. This will be strictly true only if the cost of legal migrants is linear in the 
number of migrants, since, in reality, after the next amnesty there will be more legal 
migrants than after the initial amnesty. Solving (14), we get:  
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For A to be an optimal amnesty frequency, it must be the case that having an 
amnesty once every A periods is no more costly than having one once every B periods. 
This amounts to requiring that: 
(16)  () ()
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() () () ()
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As shown in Proposition 2, the stock of immigrants will be greater in the final, and each 
intermediate, period the longer the amnesty period. Thus, if B > A this will tend to make 
the RHS larger than the LHS. However, legalization occurs less often, which leads to 
two benefits from a later amnesty – lower costs from legalized aliens because of the less 
frequent amnesties (this is witnessed by the larger discount factor in the denominator of 
the first term on the RHS), and by the additional period of a low stock of illegal 
migrants when the amnesty frequency is lengthened. 
For A to also be an equilibrium amnesty frequency it must not be worthwhile for 
the government to “fool” migrants. In other words, given that consumers believe that an 
amnesty will occur after A periods, it must not beneficial for the government to either 
proclaim an amnesty a year earlier or to push the amnesty off for an additional year. To 
evaluate this, we assume that potential migrants can be fooled only once, and that if, for 
instance, an amnesty is pushed off by one year, migrants will then believe that 
amnesties will occur only once every A+1 periods. We consider the possibilities of 
delaying the amnesty by one year or of bringing the amnesty forward by one year. 
These conditions amount to: 
(17a)   
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The inequality (17a) compares costs of an amnesty in period A with an amnesty in 
period A+1, when migrants expect the amnesty in period A; (17b) looks one period 
earlier, and compares the cost of waiting until the expected time for an amnesty, and 
proclaiming an immediate amnesty. The same tradeoffs discussed above continue to be 
present. 
 
D. A Delayed Amnesty 
An often-used strategy is to declare an amnesty only for those who can prove that 
they have been in the country for some minimum period. Thus, for example the 1986 
U.S. amnesty required proof of residence in the U.S. from at latest January 1, 1982, and 
the Dutch 1995 amnesty required proof of presence for at least 6 years. 
The aim of such a plan is to limit the effect of the amnesty on the desire of 
migrants to enter the country in order to be eligible for the amnesty. Say the amnesty is 
only for those who have been in the country for at least τ  years. Then the lifetime value 
of immigrating depends on when one migrated. If he migrated before the cutoff date, 
e.g.,  τ ≥ e periods before the amnesty, then income is given by (12). However, if he 
migrated after the cutoff date, he will not become permanent until the next amnesty, so 
his lifetime income is given by: 
(18) 
() ( )










































P C W W A e N P
P NW e V
 
The effect of such a plan is that all those who fall into this latter category will have a 
greatly lessened incentive to migrate. 
The other side of the coin, of course, is that such a plan limits the benefit from the 
amnesty, since all those who entered the country during this “incubation” period remain 
in the country, and remain illegal. Thus, the stock of illegals is reduced, but not to zero. 
The stock of immigrants over time is exhibited in Figure 3. Note that, compared to 
Figure 2, the stock rises slower due to the decreased incentive to migrate, but is also 
falls less after an amnesty.   
The government would like to set internal and border control allocations, an 
amnesty frequency, and an incubation period that brings the cost from illegal 
immigrants to a minimum. Thus, in an analogous manner to that above, the government  
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would like to minimize 























where  () A M
L
A  and  () A M
I
A  are, respectively, the stocks of legal and illegal migrants 
remaining after the amnesty is granted. Conditions analogous to (16) and (17) will need 
to hold for this to be an equilibrium. 
 
E. A Limited Amnesty 
Many countries plagued by illegal immigration are reluctant to grant the type of 
amnesty granted in, for instance, the U.S. (where citizenship was granted) because they 
are not interested in having these illegals become citizens in their country. For these 
countries, the goal of the amnesty is often to rid the country of these undesirables. To 
this end, they devise an amnesty that will be sufficiently attractive to entice the illegal 
immigrants to come forward, while at the same time limiting their duration in the 
country. A limited amnesty is just such a plan, whereby workers are given a permit to 
remain and work in the country for a limited period of time, and are then required to 
leave once the permit has expired.
8 Thus, for example, the Greek amnesty in 1998 was 
comprised of two stages.
9 In the first stage workers were invited to submit applications 
for a temporary residence permit (a white card), and in the second, they could apply for 
a green card if they could prove that they had worked for at least 40 days between 
January and July 1998. The green card enabled the worker to remain 1-3 years, with 
subsequent renewal for two years possible. Special provisions also existed for the 
granting of five-year permits. The 43% of those with white cards who were not granted 
green cards and who remained in the country are again considered illegal.
10 
                                                 
8 Any such plan must lend for the contingency that the worker will decide to overstay his permit, and will 
disappear into the economy and once again become an illegal immigrant. Thus, the granting of such a 
permit must include a mechanism that will allow the authorities the ability to enforce the departure of 
these illegal aliens. One such mechanism is the posting of a bond by the worker or his employer that is 
forfeited if the worker does not leave the country on time. For the effects of such bonds on illegal 
immigrants and their employers, see Epstein, Hillman and Weiss (1999). 
9 See Trends in International Migration, 1999. 
10 Korea, for instance, took a slightly different route. In their 1997-8 and 1999 amnesties they did not 
grant work permits, but rather allowed the illegal residents to leave the country without risking sanctions. 
This can be incorporated in our model by setting CD=0 if you accept the amnesty.  
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A limited amnesty introduces a new consideration into the model. Until now, all 
those eligible for an amnesty requested the amnesty. With a limited amnesty, however, 
those workers with a longer horizon will choose to bypass the amnesty, and instead 
remain illegal. In particular, the amnesty will certainly be accepted by anyone whose 
remaining work-life is shorter than the length of the work permit, but will tend to be 
rejected by those who will continue working for many years after the permit expires. 
Consider, then, an illegal worker, i, with a remaining work-life of X years, being 
offered a permit for Y years, Y<X. He will accept the offer if:  
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Note that our assumption that the worker's wage does not change once becoming 
legalized (see fn. 8), in particular limits the desirability of such a program. Were we to 
make the wage once legalized higher than when illegal, the number of people coming 
forward to accept this offer of amnesty would increase. The qualitative results, however, 
would not change. 
There will also be an effect on those intending to migrate. The expected income of 
a potential immigrant will be equal to 
(21)   
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The first term in the brackets give the expected income if the worker accepts the 
amnesty he will be offered, and the second term is the expected income if he does not. 
This latter term is identical to (10). 
The result of this type of amnesty is that, in most cases, the amnesty will not rid 
the country of all illegal workers. Some will remain illegal, and continue to inflict the 
same costs upon the host country as in the original model. However, the incentive to 
migrate to the country is less than with a full amnesty, so again the stock of illegals in 
the country can be expected to vary as in Figure 3.   
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Interestingly, such a plan will actually make the incomes of those who do not 
accept the amnesty higher because government allocations will be shifted towards 
border controls and away from internal controls. This occurs because the existence of an 
amnesty increases flows, but the amnesty itself lowers the stock. Thus, the essence of 
this amnesty limits its degree of success. 
Much as in the pervious section, the government would like to allocate resources 
and set the length of the temporary work permit and of the amnesty frequency such that 
it minimizes costs from the immigrants (both illegal and legal). In order to do so, the 
government should take into account the effect the length of the permit has on the 
percentage of people that will accept the amnesty offer, and the effect on new migration.  
It is also possible to combine a limited amnesty with a delayed amnesty. As 
discussed above, the goals of these two types of amnesty are different. Those using a 
limited amnesty are interested in getting rid of as many migrants as they can, while 
those using a delayed amnesty tend to desire the naturalization of the migrants who have 
been in the country for a sufficiently long period. Perhaps for this reason, there have 
not, to our knowledge, been amnesties that have combined these two arrangements. It is 
possible, however, that the two could be used in tandem in order to minimize costs. 
From a modeling perspective, this would mean simply combining this and the last 
section, and minimizing costs over three arguments – the frequency of the amnesties, 
the incubation period, and the length of the temporary permit. The qualitative results 




A. Intertemporal budget transfers 
In Section II we considered a situation in which there was no amnesty, and the 
budget was fixed in each period. Consider now the effect of a budget that is fixed for the 
entire period, but can be transferred intertemporaly. In this case, even without 
considering an amnesty, the simple solution inherent from Lemma 1 may not hold. 
Equation (3) continues to be the objective function, but the third constraint now 
becomes: 
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We thus rewrite the objective function as: 
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where λ  is a LaGrange multiplier. The first-order conditions are: 


























































and condition (9). Comparing (11) and (12) for any given i, we get condition (8) again – 
independent of the amount allocated to a certain period, the allocation within the period 
is the same as before, for the same reasons. Comparing the allocation across periods is 
more difficult, and without further specifying the variables little can be said. We will, 
however consider two cases. Under the assumption that the flow (m) is constant over 
time, we consider the case where there is no time preference (i.e., all the  i α 's are equal), 
and the case where only the stock at the end of the period (possibly when a new election 
is to be held) is of interest. 
 
i. No time preference 
If all periods are given equal weight, then  () 1 1 + = T k α , so the first order 
condition can be rewritten as:  
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This yields the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. Beginning below steady-state, with a constant flow of immigrants, and 
when each period is of equal importance, allocations to border control will decrease 
over time, while the direction of change in allocations to internal control is ambiguous. 
In addition, as long as the flow of migrants is nondecreasing over time the ratio of 
expenditures on border control to internal control decreases over time. 
Proof. Comparing the first order condition (24') over two consecutive periods, we get 
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The bracketed term on the RHS is clearly smaller than that on the LHS, so the second 
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Comparing (23') for two consecutive periods: 
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Since  1 − ≥ k k M M , it is not clear whether expenditures increase or fall. The last part of 
the proposition follows directly from Lemma 2.        Q.E.D. 
Decreasing border control expenditures occur because earlier arrivals affect the 
stock for more periods, so it is more efficient to reduce the stock during the earlier 
periods rather than in later periods when their effect is for a more limited time period. 
This effect would seem to exist for internal controls also, but there is an opposing effect 
due to the growing size of the stock, making internal controls more crucial in later 
periods.  
Note that, in keeping with our discussion of amnesties above, if the flow of 




ii. Preference for the last period 
In settings such as elections, there is often significant stress placed on occurrences 
during an election year. This is the reason for the well-known finding of increased 
governmental expenditures (particularly at the municipal level) during election years 
(see, for example, Nordhaus, 1975, Frey and Schneider, 1978, Rosenberg, 1992, and 
Rozevitch and Weiss, 1993). This idea extends to any issue pertinent to a campaign, 
with illegal immigration being no exception. It would be difficult for a challenger to an 
office to make a case of the level of illegal immigration a few years earlier. Clearly, the 
current state of affairs is what voters are concerned with. We thus propose as follows: 
Proposition 4. When the stock in the last period is the only concern of the government, 
and the flow of migrants is nondecreasing over time, allocations to both border control 
and internal control will increase over time. 
Proof. Under this setting, the optimization problem is simplified, as  1 = T α , and all 
other 0 = i α . The first order conditions become: 























































Compare now two consecutive periods, k and k+1, and assume that  1 + ≤ k k m m . From 
(24") we see that in equilibrium: 
(28)  () ( ) () ( ) 1 1
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Since the first term is strictly less than one and the second derivative of 
B
i P  is strictly 




k E E > + 1 .          
With respect to internal controls, a comparison of two consecutive years yields: 










− + − + 1 1 1 1.   
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Since the population of illegal immigrants grows until the steady state and then stays 




k E E > + 1 .   Q.E.D. 
The logic behind the border control result is that immigrants who enter at an 
earlier period may still be caught and deported later on, so it is less important to catch 
them at the border. Those who manage to enter closer to the election year, however, will 
probably still be around at the end of the period, so it becomes more important to keep 
them out. With respect to internal controls the larger the stock the more illegals will be 
caught and deported, so expenditures on internal control become more cost efficient. 
Again, the possibility of an amnesty will strengthen this result since flows will tend to 
increase over time, although the increasing budgets allocated to apprehension may 
dampen this increased desire to migrate.
11 
 
B. Alternative Formulations of Heterogeneity  
In the model above (Section IIB) we assumed that potential migrants were drawn 
from a population of workers who were heterogeneous in their wages. An alternative 
modelling would have source country wages identical (they could all, for instance, be 
unemployed in their home countries), but they could have differing levels of other traits. 
For instance, their skills could differ, in which case the better workers would be the first 
to migrate. Alternatively, even if workers are homogeneous in abilities, they could 
differ in their attachment to the source country. Thus, married people would be less 
likely to move, particularly if they have young children. Also, those with elderly parents 
might be less inclined to abandon them. 
An additional alternative deserves further development, and that is differing levels 
of risk aversion. In the model we assumed workers are risk neutral, and so considered 
only expected income. If workers, however, have differing levels of risk aversion (or 
risk loving), a self-selection equilibrium can be had without resorting to heterogeneous 
workers. Since there is risk in migrating – the worker may not get into the country 
(border control) or may be apprehended and deported (internal control) – those who are 
least risk-averse will be the first to migrate. The result of this is that those who come 
                                                 
11 It will not, though, affect the gross flow in the last year before the amnesty since internal control will 
not be effective for them.  
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may be the most risk-loving of the potential migrants – which may help explain why so 
many of them end up involved in risky activities, such as criminal activities. 
 
C. Uncertainty 
An interesting empirical aspect of amnesties is that there tend to be migrants who 
come forward to get an amnesty, but are then denied the amnesty and instead shipped 
out of the country. This seems to be an unintentional (or perhaps intentional) side effect 
of the amnesty. In this section we consider whether this can be an equilibrium strategy. 
Say potential candidates for an amnesty are distributed along an additional scale 
with respect to some variable that is of concern to the authorities. For instance, 
authorities may say that those found to have been involved in illegal activities of some 
sorts (theft, drugs, etc.) will be brought before a board to decide whether to grant them 
amnesty or to deport them. In this case, those clearly not involved will step forward, 
those heavily involved will not, but those in the middle will step forward only if their 
expected gain is positive.  
From Equations (12) and (10) we can discern that the gain from being granted an 
amnesty to a worker depends on how many periods he has remaining in his worklife, 
and is given by: 
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The first set of terms is the addition wage received over the migrant’s remaining 
worklife, and the second set of terms is the expected savings from the fact that it is clear 
that he will not have to bear the deportation cast once he has received the amnesty. If, 
however, the worker who steps forward for an amnesty is denied that amnesty and, 
instead, deported, his expected loss (relative to had he not come forward) will be: 
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The first set of terms, again, being the loss in expected wage, and the second set of 









k P  is 
because while the cost will certainly have to be paid, there was a probability that it  
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would have been paid anyway (had he been caught), and so the loss from coming 
forward is just the difference. 
Combining (31) and (32), and defining P(A) as the probability of being granted the 
amnesty given the migrant’s place on the scale, the migrants who will come forward to 
request amnesty will be those for whom: 
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This will include two groups – those for whom the probability of gaining the amnesty is 
high and those for whom the alternative wage at home is sufficiently high so that the 
risk is relatively low. 
The outcome of such a “fuzzy” amnesty declaration will be that there will be some 
deported, but they will tend to be those who have committed the least grievous crimes 
rather than those who the country would truly like to rid itself of. This will also be true 
since many of those will be earning higher salaries doing what they are doing than if 
they became legal (and, as a result, visible). 
 
IV. Summary 
This paper presented a first attempt at understanding the many issues involved in 
the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We have considered government 
behavior with respect to allocations for limiting infiltration (border control) and 
apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, 
the timing of amnesties, and limitations of those amnesties. We have been able to reach 
some conclusions with respect to allocations and the flow of immigrants, and have 
gained insight into the timing and manner of amnesties. More specific conclusions 
would require more specific functional specifications. We have also considered various 
extensions such as intertemporal transfers of policing funds, risk-aversion, and 
“fuzziness” in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending 
and deporting undesirables.  
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The paper has numerous empirical implications regarding changing allocations 
over time, changes in migration flows over time, and differences between countries that 
grant amnesties and those that do not (perhaps because the stock or flow of illegals does 
not warrant such a measure). We leave this to future research. 
The paper yields some policy implications. Countries with illegal migration 
problems need to define their goals before embarking on an amnesty program. Those 
interested in ridding themselves of the illegal workers will be best off with some type of 
limited amnesty whereby they grant limited work permits that require the immigrant to 
leave the country at the end of the period. For such a plan to work, however, it is 
necessary to guarantee that the worker can, in fact, be found at the end of the period, 
and that he does not simply blend back into the background. One way to do this is by 
requiring a bond to be posted by the worker (or by his employer) that is forfeited if the 
person does not leave. If the bond is sufficiently high, the worker will be likely to return 
to his home country. 
A country interested, instead, in absorbing the “worthy” immigrants (often defined 
in terms of time spent in the country and the worker's past employment record) may 
want to consider a delayed amnesty, whereby only those fulfilling these requirements 
are granted the amnesty. An option open to all countries is to use a “fuzzy” amnesty, 
whereby the exact criteria to be granted the amnesty (whether a temporary work permit 
or citizenship) are not clearly defined, allowing the country to deport some of the more 
undesirable immigrants. Such a plan, however, will likely exhibit only limited success, 
as the most undesirable people (e.g., the hard criminals) will be unlikely to come 
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Selected Regularization Programs 
 
 




Argentina 1994  210,000   
France 1981-2  121,100   
 1997-8  77,800  143,000  applicants 
Greece  1997-8  374,000  Granted White cards, of which 220,000 
applied for green cards. Permits to remain 
up to 5 years. 
Italy 1987-8  118,700   
 1990  217,700   
 1996  227,300  258,761  applicants 
  1998  350,000  Number of applications received 
Korea  1997-8  45,000  Allowed to leave without sanctions 
 1999  ?   
Portugal 1992-3 39,200   
 1996  21,800   
Romania  1997  30,000  Extended temporary residence visas 
Spain  1985-6  43,800  Number of applications received 
 1991  110,100   
 1996  21,300   
United States  1986  2,684,900  1989-1996 under 1986 Immigration and 
Reform Control Act. Excludes 
dependents. 
  1997-8  405,000  Estimates. Nicaraguan Adjustment and 
Central American Relief Act (1997), and 
Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act 
(1998). 





































































































































Period  A  A  A  A 